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ON THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF LAW
CASS R. SUNSTEINt
IfI had known that not a single lunch counter would open as a result
of my action I could not have done differently than I did. If I had known
violence would result, I could not have done differently than I did. I am
thankful for the sit-ins iffor no other reason than that they provided me
with an opportunity for making a slogan into a reality, by turning a
decision into an action. It seems to me that this is what life is all about.
-Sandra Cason.1
We are all Expressionists part of the time. Sometimes we just want to
scream loudly at injustice, or to stand up and be counted. These are noble
motives, but any serious revolutionist must often deprive himself of the
pleasures of self-expression. He must judge his actions by their ultimate
effects on institutions.
-Herbert Simon.
2
INTRODUCTION
Actions are expressive; they carry meanings.- This is true for
nearly everything we do, from the most mundane to the most
significant. For example, a lawyer who wears a loud tie to court will
be signalling something distinctive about his self-conception and his
attitude toward others; so too with a law professor who teaches in
blue jeans; so too with a student who comes to class in a business
suit. What can be said for nonverbal acts applies to purely verbal
statements as well. A bank president who uses the terms "Miss" and
"Mrs.," or who refers to African Americans as "Negroes," will be
showing a wide range of things about his attitudes on matters of
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor ofJurisprudence, University
of Chicago. I am grateful to Dan Kahan, Lawrence Lessig, Martha Nussbaum,
Richard Posner, and David Strauss for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
'JAMES MILLER, "DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS": FROM PORT HURON TO THE
SIEGE OF CHICAGO 52 (1987).
2 
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MY LIFE 281 (1991).
- In law, Lawrence Lessig offers the best discussion of this idea in The Regulation
of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). I owe a general debt to Lessig's
important paper and especially to his discussion of the collective action problem
posed by efforts at changing social meanings. See id. at 993-1007.
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gender and race. So too with a Southern politician who uses the
terms "Ms." and "African American."
In these and other cases, what the agent will be communicating,
or be taken to mean, may or may not have a great deal to do with
his particular intentions. In this sense, the meanings of actions are
not fully within the agent's control. Indeed, some agents may not
even be aware of the relevant meanings. Consider a foreigner
whose very foreignness is often signalled by obliviousness to the
social meanings of his actions. What he says may be very different
from what he means.
The social meanings of actions are very much a function of
existing social norms. When a social norm tells people not to
smoke in public places, the social meaning of smoking is obtuseness,
discourtesy, or worse. When a social norm requires people to dress
casually for dinner, formal attire "means" something bad, like a
desire to seem superior or a manifestation of an odd social rigidity.
And when social norms change, social meaning changes too. Thus
the social meanings of lighting up a cigarette, or engaging in an act
of sexual harassment, or using a condom, or refusing to eat meat,
are very different in 1996 from what they were in 1966, because of
dramatic shifts in underlying norms.
What can be said for actions can also be said for law. Many
people support law because of the statements made by law, and
disagreements about law are frequently debates over the expressive
content of law. Much of the debate over school segregation, for
example, was also a debate about the meaning of laws calling for
segregation. Plessy v. Ferguson4 asserted that such laws did not
"mean" black inferiority;5 Brown v. Board of Education6 tried to
respond to this assertion with empirical work suggesting the
contrary.' Or, consider debates over capital punishment. Many
people who oppose capital punishment would be unlikely to shift
their position even if evidence were to show that capital punishment
does have a deterrent effect. They are concerned about the
expressive content of capital punishment, not about its ineffective-
ness as a deterrent (or about other nonexpressive grounds for
4 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
' See id. at 544 (noting that segregation laws "do not necessarily imply the
inferiority of either race to the other").
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See id. at 494 n.1 1 (relying on social science evidence that showed that segrega-
tion generated a feeling of inferiority among African-Americans).
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punishment).8 And many people who endorse capital punishment
would not be much moved by evidence that capital punishment does
not deter people from committing crimes. Their primary concern
is the symbolic or expressive content of the law, not aggregate
murder rates.
9
Very recently, the enormously lengthy and heated debate over
flag burning has been permeated by expressive concerns. If we ask
whether the debate is about how best to deter flag burning, we will
find the debate unintelligible. Few people have burned the
American flag in recent years, and it is reasonable to suppose that
a constitutional amendment making it possible to criminalize flag
burning would have among its principal consequences a dramatic
increase in annual acts of flag burning. In fact, adopting a
constitutional amendment may be the best possible way to promote
the incidence of flag burning. In these circumstances it seems clear
that those who support the amendment are motivated not so much
by consequences as by expressive concerns.1 0 They appear to want
to make a statement about the venality of the act of flag burning,
perhaps in order to affect social norms, perhaps because they think
that making the statement is intrinsically good.
Much of the contemporary debate over the regulation of hate
speech is similar. It is above all about the social meaning of such
regulations. Do such regulations "mean" that victims of hate speech
require special paternalistic protections, are weak and thin-skinned,
and unable to take care of themselves? Or do they "mean" that
bigotry is utterly unacceptable in a liberal society? Debates of this
kind could not plausibly be focused on consequences, for the stakes
are relatively low and thus cannot justify the amount of time and
energy devoted to the issue. In this way, debates over flag burning
8 1 do not attempt here to sort out the relation between expressive and other
grounds for criminal punishment.
9 See Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental
Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 L. & SOC'Y REV. 21, 40 (1982) (finding that
"[p]olitical and social beliefs ... exercise[d] a strong influence upon support for
capital punishment, while the influence of crime-related concerns was small"); Phoebe
C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the
Death Penalty,J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1994, at 19,27 (finding that, while belief in the
death penalty as an effective deterrent hovered around 60% from 1972 to 1991,
support for the death penalty during that period rose from 58% to 75%).
10 The same thing might be said about any law that drives conduct underground.
Even if the aggregate incidence of harmful conduct is not decreased, some people
support relevant laws on expressive grounds. Consider prohibitions on the use of
drugs or on certain sexual activity such as homosexuality, adultery, and fornication.
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and debates over hate speech have a great deal in common; they are
expressive in character.
Consider, too, the subject of risk regulation. In environmental
protection, public debate is often focused on the perceived social
meaning of law. Thus the Endangered Species Act has a special
salience as a symbol of a certain conception of the relationship
between human beings and their environment, and emissions
trading systems are frequently challenged because they are said to
"make a statement" that reflects an inappropriate valuation of the
environment. 1 In the same way, mandatory recycling (as opposed
to curbside charges, which seem far better from an economic
standpoint 2 ) may well receive public support on expressive grounds.
In the legal profession, the same may also be true of mandatory pro
bono work (as opposed to compulsory donations from lawyers who
refuse to do such work)."3
In this Article I explore the expressive function of law-the
function of law in "making statements" as opposed to controlling
behavior directly. 4 I do so by focusing on the particular issue of
"See STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECONOMISTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 2 (1981) ("[T]he question of whether or not to use economic incentives
in environmental policy is not simply a technical question, but is also an ideological,
philosophical question.., and many noneconomist participants in the environmental
debate tend to react to the issue in ideological terms."). I do not mean to endorse
the view that emissions trading systems reflect an inappropriate valuation of the
environment.
12 See Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An Incentive Approach to
Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 696 (1990) (comparing
various solid waste regulatory policies and finding that on a purely economic basis
perfect curbside charge policy and perfect deposit-refund policy always achieve the
first-best allocation of resources).
" See Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A
Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 947-51 (1991) (arguing that
mandatory pro bono requirements will not affect lawyers' conception of their
professional duty if they are allowed to hire others to do the work on their behalf).
14 For valuable discussions of the expressive function of legal and economic
norms, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993)
(discussing expressive norms); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35
(1993) [hereinafter NOZICK, RATIONALITY] (discussing "symbolic utility," the utility
that is imputed to an action or outcome in accordance with its symbolic meaning);
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 370-88 (1981) [hereinafter NOZICK,
EXPLANATIONS] (discussing the symbolic message of retributive punishment); Jean
Hampton, An Expressive Theoy of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1
(Wesley Cragg ed. 1992) (developing an expressive theory of retribution to explain
and justify retributive practice); see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 1996) (manuscript at 3) ("Punishment
is notjust a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention that signifies
moral condemnation."); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
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how legal "statements" might be designed to change social
norms. 5 I catalogue a range of possible (and in my view legiti-
mate) efforts to alter norms through legal expressions about
appropriate evaluative attitudes. I also argue that the expressive
function of law makes most sense in connection with efforts to
change norms and that if legal statements produce bad conse-
quences, they should not be enacted even if they seem reasonable
or noble. Empirical questions loom throughout, and I do offer
several empirical claims; but my goal is normative as well as
descriptive or positive."
This Article is divided into seven parts. Part I offers some
definitional notes. Part II discusses the use of legal "statements" as
a means of correcting social norms that all or most people disap-
prove. Part III deals with risk-taking behavior. Part IV explores the
use of law to fortify norms involving the appropriate use of money.
Part V discusses issues of equality. Part VI qualifies the basic
argument. It discusses the relationship between the expressive
function of law and the issue of consequences; it also explores
constraints on the use of law to express judgments about appropri-
ate values.
I. DEFINITIONAL NOTES
At the outset it is important to say that we might understand the
expressive function of law in two different ways. First, and most
straightforwardly, the law's "statement" about, for example, the
impropriety of monetary exchanges may be designed to affect social
norms and in that way ultimately to affect both judgments and
behavior. On this view, an expressive approach to law depends on
an assessment of social consequences; certain expressions are
Regulatoiy State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 66-71 (1995) (arguing that the expressive
dimensions of policy choices are appropriate concerns for policymakers); Pildes,supra
note 13, at 939-40 (arguing that cultural consequences are a significant but frequently
ignored dimension of public policy).
"5 This may be an example of the tendency in law schools to overemphasize the
function of law in producing and changing social norms. For an important corrective,
see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991). As Ellickson acknowledges, however, law provides fundamental entitlements
within which norm creation and management can occur at the private level. There
are important overlaps between private norm entrepreneurs and legal efforts at norm
management through the expressive function of law. See infra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
16 I take up some descriptive and positive issues in Cass R. Sunstein, SocialNorrms
and Social Roles, 96 COLuM. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1996).
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favored because they will (ultimately) have good consequences.
Here there is a prediction about the facts: an appropriately framed
law may influence social norms and push them in the right
direction. For example, if the law mandates recycling, perhaps it
will affect social norms about the environment in a way that is
different from (and better than) the way curbside charges might
affect norms. Or if the law wrongly treats something-let us suppose
reproductive capacities-as a commodity, social norms may be
affected in a troublesome way.
Sometimes the claim that the law affects norms is plausible.
Prevailing norms, like preferences and beliefs, are not a presocial
given but a product of a complex set of social forces, 17 possibly
including law.'" Laws designed to produce changes in norms will
be my focus here. But sometimes people support a law, not because
of its effects on norms, but because they believe that it is intrin-
sically valuable for the relevant "statement" to be made. 9 And
sometimes law will have little or no effect on social norms. Society
is filled with legal provisions allowing market exchanges of goods
and services-like pets and babysitting, for example-that are not
seen as mere commodities but are valued for reasons other than
their use. The question, therefore, remains whether the statement
will have the claimed effect on social norms. It is fully plausible to
say that, although a law that permits prostitution reflects an
inappropriate valuation of sexuality, any adverse effect of the law
on social norms is so small as to be an implausible basis for
objection.
Thus a second understanding of the expressive function of law
does not concern itself with effects on norms." Instead, its
grounding is connected with the individual interest in integrity.
Following a brief but suggestive discussion by Bernard Williams,
21
we might say that personal behavior is not concerned solely with
producing states of affairs and that, if it were, we would have a hard
time making sense of important aspects of our lives. There are also
17 See id. (manuscript pt. III.B).
,I focus here on law motivated by norm change.
"See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20 For a discussion of the role of symbols in politics, see ELLICKSON, supra note 15,
at 116-18.
21 See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 108-09 (JJ.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973) (noting that people
often refuse to do a disagreeable act even though their refusal will result in worse
consequences).
ON THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF LAW
issues involving personal integrity, commitment, the narrative
continuity of a life, and the individual and social meaning of
personal conduct. The expressive dimension of action can be an
important reason for action.22 Williams offers cases that might be
understood in these terms. Someone might refuse to kill an
innocent person at the request of a terrorist, even if the conse-
quence of the refusal is that many more people will be killed. Or
a pacifist might refuse to take ajob in a munitions factory, even if
the refusal will have no salutary effects.
Our responses to these cases are not adequately captured in
terms that ignore expressive considerations.23 It is possible that
the refusal to kill an innocent person is consequentially justified on
balance, for people who refuse to commit bad acts may cultivate
attitudes that lead to value-maximizing behavior.24 But this is a
complex matter. My point is only that human behavior is some-
times a function of expressive considerations. 25 Indeed, it should
be possible to model behavior by identifying the role of such
considerations.26  We might agree on this point even if we also
believe that consequences count (mediated as they are by expressive
norms) and that people should not be fanatical.27
There is a rough analog at the social and legal level. A society
might identify the norms to which it is committed and insist on
those norms via law, even if the consequences of the insistence are
obscure or unknown. A society might, for example, insist on an
antidiscrimination law for expressive reasons even if it does not
22 See NOZICK, RATIONALITY, supra note 14, at 26-35 (discussing symbolic utility).
' I should note, however, that it is not clear that Williams is interested in the
expressive meaning of action; he may instead be concerned with the agent's capacity
to make sense of his or her life. There are interesting questions about the extent to
which the agent may be both "saying" things and "hearing" those things via conduct.
24 See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS 10-30 (1988).
' And vice versa. See Lessig, supra note 3, at 1012 ("Meaning construction
is more than speaking differently. For it to function, it must succeed in recreat-
ing understandings and expectations. To create these understandings and expec-
tations ... requires a change in behavior sufficient to internalize a set of under-
standings that construct this new meaning, or, in the case of [a] defensive construc-
tion, a change in behavior to resecure a social meaning that would otherwise
dissolve.").
26 See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTE (forthcoming 1996); TIMUR
KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE
FALSIFICATION 1-21 (1995) (discussing "preference falsification," the act of misrepre-
senting one's genuine wants under perceived social pressures).27See infra part V.
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know whether the law actually helps members of minority groups.
A society might endorse or reject capital punishment because it
wants to express a certain understanding of the appropriate course
of action when one person takes the life of another. The point
bears on the cultural role of law, adjudication, and even Supreme
Court decisions. The empirical effects of those decisions are highly
disputed. 28 If the Supreme Court holds that segregation is unlaw-
ful, that certain restrictions on hate speech violate the First Amend-
ment, or that students cannot be asked to pray in school, the real-
world consequences may be much smaller than is conventionally
thought. But the close attention American society pays to the
Court's pronouncements is connected with the expressive or
symbolic character of those pronouncements. When the Court
makes a decision, it is often taken to be speaking on behalf of the
nation's basic principles and commitments. This assumption is a
matter of importance quite apart from its consequences as conven-
tionally understood. It is customary and helpful to point to the
Court's educative effect. 9 But perhaps the expressive effect of the
Court's decisions, or their expressive function, better captures what
is often at stake.
The expressive grounds for action should be distinguished from
action undertaken solely because it is believed to be right. It is
possible to participate in an act of political protest because the
protest is for a good cause without believing that participation is
justified because it is expressive. Throughout this Article I will be
dealing with actions, including legal actions, that are expressive in
character.
I do not claim that the expressive effects of law, thus under-
stood, are decisive or that they cannot be countered by a demon-
stration of more conventional bad consequences. In fact, I will
argue otherwise and in that way try to vindicate Simon's remark in
the epigraph to this Article; my principal aim is to defend laws that
attempt to alter norms, rather than laws that merely "speak." It
cannot be doubted, however, that the expressive function is a large
part of legal debate. Without understanding the expressive function
28 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 28 (1991) (noting that "attempts to ground [the view that courts can
effectively bring about social reform] empirically are not entirely satisfying").
See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 964 (1992) ("[T]he Supreme Court cannot be fully understood
except as an institution with educative responsibilities, responsibilities that depend
upon the excellence of its arguments.").
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of law, we will have a hard time getting an adequate handle on
public views on such issues as civil rights, prostitution, the environ-
ment, endangered species, capital punishment, and abortion.
II. THE EXPRESsIVE FUNCTION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
Many social norms solve collective action problems.3 0 Some of
these problems involve coordination; others involve prisoner's
dilemmas. Norms solve such problems by imposing social sanctions
on defectors.3 ' When defection violates norms, defectors will
30 See ELuICKSON, supra note 15, at 167 ("[M]embers of tight social groups ...
informally encourage each other to engage in cooperative behavior."); EDNA
ULLMANN-MARGALrr, THE EMERGENCE OF NoRMs 22-60 (1977) (arguing that norms
are likely to evolve to help people achieve cooperative outcomes in prisoner's
dilemma situations).
" I am offering the traditional account here, but there are serious difficulties with
this account. The most serious problem is that any collective action problem can be
characterized as such because of a wide range of norms, and not only because of the
particular norm that is said to be producing the problem. The traditional account
focuses on one norm, but the problem is the product of a wide range of them.
Suppose, for example, that there is no norm against littering; that people think
that there is too much litter; and that they would like to create a new, anti-littering
norm. Would it be right to say that this case involves a collective action problem that
would best be solved by the aid of a new social norm against littering? The statement
would not be false but it would be misleading and incomplete. What gives rise to the
collective action problem is an array of individual judgments and desires that are
themselves (in all likelihood) a function of social norms. There are, for example,
norms against clutter, norms involving certain conceptions of aesthetics, norms about
public spaces. If people "want" a new norm-the norm against littering-their desire
probably stems from many other norms, such as norms favoring clean rather than
dirty parks, norms in favor of shared rather than maldistributed burdens, and norms
in favor of solutions through norms rather than coercion or fines.
When a situation is supposed to create a prisoner's dilemma that would be
satisfied by some norm Z, the situation presupposes a range of norms A through Y,
which are being held constant and not being put in contention. The question then
becomes: Why is it that norm Z (the norm with respect to littering) is put into
question, rather than some other norm (the norm favoring clean parks)? Why should
a norm be established in favor of cleaning up after one's dog, instead of changing the
norms governing exposure to the relevant mess? This question has yet to be
addressed in the existing work on collective action and social norms. The traditional
account takes a set of norms as given, without seeing that they might themselves be
altered, rather than altering the particular norm that has been put into question.
On the economic account, we might solve the problem by asking which norms
can be changed most cheaply. Just as one person in a legal controversy might be the
cheapest cost avoider, so one norm in a collective action problem might be the
cheapest target of norm management. It is plausible to think that it is much more
efficient to create a norm in favor of clean-up than to create a norm making people
approve of clutter and mess. On this view, we would not inquire into the merits or
basis of existing norms, but ask more simply which norms can be altered at lowest
cost. I speculate that an implicit judgment of this kind lies behind the traditional
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probably feel shame, an important motivational force. The commu-
nity may enforce its norms through informal punishment, the most
extreme form of which is ostracism. But the most effective use of
norms is ex ante. The expectation of shame-a kind of social "tax,"
sometimes a very high one-is usually enough to produce compli-
ance.
Thus, for example, if there is a norm in favor of cooperation,
people may be able to interact with one another in a way that
prevents their actions from being self-defeating.32 For example,
professors write tenure letters and engage in a wide range of
administrative tasks that they could refuse to do at little cost
(putting to one side shame-the emotional price of violating
institutional norms). Or, suppose that a community is pervaded by
a strong norm against littering. If the norm is truly pervasive, an
important problem of environmental degradation can be solved
without any need for legal intervention." The norm can do what
the law would do at possibly much greater cost.3 4  The norms
associated with "courtesy" are an especially important source of
successful group interaction.
Sometimes, however, good norms do not exist, and bad ones
exist in their stead-where we understand "good" or "bad" by
reference to the functions of norms in solving collective action
problems. Imagine, for example, that there is no norm in favor of
refusing to litter, or that there is even a norm in favor of littering.
In the face of such norms, the social meaning of littering may be
independence and fearlessness, and the social meaning of cleaning
up or failing to litter may be fastidiousness or even cowardice or
neurosis. In such a situation a society would, under imaginable
assumptions, do well to reconsider and reconstruct its norms. It
may be able to do so through voluntary efforts. Indeed, norm
entrepreneurs in the private sphere attempt to change norms by
identifying their bad consequences and trying to shift the bases of
approach to this problem.
S2See DAVID W. BROWN, WHEN STRANGERS COOPERATE: USING SOCIAL
CONVENTIONS TO GOVERN OURSELVES 23-54 (1995) (describing various "meta-
conventions," precepts of behavior that clarify the basis for our cooperation with
strangers and consequently make coordination problems easier to solve).
" For a detailed discussion of the hypothesis that close-knit groups generate
norms that maximize the objective welfare of group members, see ELLICKSON, supra
note 15, at 167-83.
' For a discussion of the role of norms in environmental protection, see CAROL
M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 283-85 (1994).
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shame and pride. Many norm entrepreneurs are alert to the
existence of collective action problems. We can find such entrepre-
neurs in different sectors of social life-consider Louis Farrakhan,
Catharine MacKinnon, William BennettJerry Falwell, Martin Luther
King, Jr., Rush Limbaugh. In the environmental setting, public
interest groups often carry out this role by pressing private conduct
in environmentally desirable directions, sometimes by providing new
grounds for both pride (a kind of informal social "subsidy") and
shame (a kind of informal social "tax"). 5
But sometimes these private efforts fail. When this is so, the law
might be enlisted as a corrective. In fact the least controversial use
of the expressive function of law operates in this way. Here the goal
is to reconstruct existing norms and to change the social meaning
of action through a legal expression or statement about appropriate
behavior. Insofar as regulatory law is concerned with collective
action problems, 6 this is a standard idea, especially in the environ-
mental context,' but also in the setting of automobile safety,
occupational safety and health, and many other problems as well.
What is perhaps less standard is to see the law as an effort to
produce adequate social norms. The law might either do the work
of such norms, or instead be designed to work directly against
existing norms and to push them in new directions. The latter idea
is grounded on the view that law will have moral weight and thus
convince people that existing norms are bad and deserve to be
replaced by new ones.
More particularly, government might think that choice is,
roughly speaking, a function of the intrinsic utility of choice, the
reputational utility of choice, and the effects of choice on a person's
self-conception. 8 If someone cleans up after his dog, or fails to do
so, his decision may reflect not only the act's intrinsic value, but
also anticipated reputational effects as well as effects on the agent's
self-esteem. We can thus extend the game theoretic insight that a
SCf. STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY, CHANGING COURSE: A GLOBAL BUSINESS
PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 181-330 (1992) (discussing
environmentally protective measures voluntarily adopted by business).
6 See ANTHONY Ocus, REGULATION 5-20 (1995).
37 
See, e.g., R. KERRY TURNER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: AN ELEMEN-
TARY INTRODUCTION 65-78 (1993) (discussing the characteristics of market
economies).
38 See BECKER, supra note 26 (discussing social capital); KURAN, supra note 26, at
35 (arguing that "the choice of public preference gives rise to three distinct returns:
intrinsic utility, reputational utility, and expressive utility").
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person's behavior often depends on expectations about behavior by
other people. Behavior and choice are a product not only of other
people's behavior, but also of the perceived judgments of other
people, and those judgments have a great deal to do with-indeed
they constitute-social norms. People act in accordance with their
perceptions of what other people think. Sometimes they act
strategically in order to avoid other people's opprobrium. It follows
that individual rationality and self-interest are a function of social
norms and are not sensibly opposed to them.
3 9
Reputational utility is of course produced by social norms, and
it may shift over time because it is likely to be endogenous to both
existing information and to law. If choice that produces collective
harm is driven by reputational utility in the direction of behavior
that has low (net) intrinsic utility for the agent, government might
think it appropriate to shift reputational utility, so that overall utility
might thereby be increased. When norms shift, the expressive
content of acts shifts as well, thus producing changes in reputational
effects.
The most conventional example involves legal mandates that
take the place of good norms, by requiring certain forms of
behavior through statutory requirements accompanied by significant
enforcement activity. Environmental law, for example, imposes
legal mandates to control industrial pollution; it adds a large
commitment of enforcement resources.
But there is a subtler and more interesting class of cases, of
special importance for understanding the expressive function of law.
These cases arise when the relevant law announces or signals a
change in social norms unaccompanied by much in the way of enforce-
ment activity. Consider, for example, laws that forbid littering and
laws that require people to clean up after their dogs. In many
localities such laws are rarely enforced through the criminal law, but
they have an important effect in signalling appropriate behavior and
in inculcating the expectation of social opprobrium and, hence,
shame in those who deviate from the announced norm. With or
without enforcement activity, such laws can help reconstruct norms
and the social meaning of action. Someone who fails to clean up
after his dog may then be showing disrespect or even contempt for
others. Many, most, or all people may see things this way, and the
" For a discussion of this point and its implications, see Sunstein, supra note 16
(manuscript pt. III.C).
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result can be large changes in behavior. Eventually there can be
norm cascades, as reputational incentives shift behavior in new
directions. 0 It should be unsurprising to find that, in many places,
people clean up after their dogs even though this is not especially
pleasant and even though the laws are rarely enforced.
When legally-induced shifts in norms help solve collective
action problems, there should be no objection in principle.41 Here,
then, is the least controversial case for the expressive function of
law.
III. NORMS INVOLVING DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR
Often the expressive function of law is brought to bear on
dangerous behavior, including behavior that is dangerous only or
principally to one's self. Of course, all behavior creates risks:
driving a car, walking on city streets, volunteering for military
service. When government tries to change norms that "subsidize"
risk-taking behavior, it must do so because of a judgment that
overall welfare will thereby be promoted. This judgment might be
rooted in an understanding that the intrinsic utility of the act is
relatively low and that reputational incentives are the real source of
the behavior. We are dealing, then, with classes of cases in which
the danger accompanying choice means that intrinsic utility is not
high, but risk-taking behavior persists because of social norms.
There are numerous examples. Elijah Anderson's vivid
sociological analysis of life in an African American ghetto shows that
social norms create a variety of risks.4 2 Powerful norms motivate
people to use and sell drugs;43 powerful norms motivate teenagers
to engage in sexual activity that may result in pregnancy.
44
Anderson shows that, with respect to drugs, pregnancy, and the use
of firearms, behavior appears to be driven in large part by reputati-
onal effects. In fact, for much risk-taking behavior, especially
among young people, social norms are crucial.4 5 Consider, for
4
1 See KURAN, suPra note 26, at 3.
4' Note, however, that these are unlikely to be Pareto improvements. There will
be losers as well as winners. For a discussion of some further complexities, see infra
part VI.A.
42 See ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETwIsE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN
COMMUNITY 76 (1990) (explaining that the Northon community has become "even
more vulnerable to a variety of social ills, from teenage pregnancy to rampant drug
use").
43 See id. at 77-111.
44 See id. at 112-34.
45 This is a principal theme in FRED M. HECHINGER, FATEFUL CHOICES: HEALTHY
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example, the existence of powerful norms governing cigarette
smoking, alcohol use, the consumption of unlawful drugs, diet and
exercise, and carrying and using firearms. We might readily
imagine, for example, that a decision to smoke a cigarette, or not
to buckle a seatbelt, would be a function not primarily of the
intrinsic utility of the underlying act but instead largely a function
of the reputational effects.
We might take the term "political correctness" to connote a
willingness to say or do something not because of its intrinsic value
but because of reputational effects. So understood, political
correctness is hardly an isolated phenomenon. It occurs whenever
people attempt to avoid the reputational costs associated with
violating norms in their community. And when norms shift, turning
reputational costs into benefits and vice versa, behavior can shift as
well. Certainly this is true when acts and statements are a product
of pressures that can make people "falsify" their internal judgments
and beliefs.46 With respect to dangerous behavior, it would be
desirable if norms that subsidize choice were turned into norms that
are neutral with respect to choice or even into norms that operate
as implicit taxes.
Norm entrepreneurs in the private sector can play an important
role here. Thus, for example, there has been a dramatic decrease
in cigarette smoking among young African Americans, a decrease
apparently fueled by changes in social norms for which private norm
entrepreneurs are partly responsible.4 In the relevant communi-
ties, the social meaning of smoking is not attractiveness and
rebelliousness, but dirtiness and willingness to be duped. More
broadly, religious leaders often try to change social norms involving
risky conduct such as promiscuous behavior.
But here as elsewhere, private efforts may be unsuccessful. In
this light, law might attempt to express a judgment about the
underlying activity in such a way as to alter social norms. If we see
norms as a tax on or subsidy to choice, the law might attempt to
change a subsidy into a tax, or vice versa. In fact, this is a central,
even if implicit, goal behind much risk regulation policy. Educa-
tional campaigns often have the goal of changing the social meaning
YOUTH FOR THE 21sT CENTURY (1992).
0 See generally KURAN, supra note 26, at 3-21 (discussing the significance of
preference falsification).
" See Sunstein, supra note 16 (manuscript pt. I.C) (describing the private
antismoking campaign in the African American community).
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of risk-taking activity.48 Going beyond the provision of informa-
tion, coercion might be defended as a way of increasing social
sanctions on certain behavior. Through time, place, and manner
restrictions or flat bans, for example, the law might attempt to
portray behavior like smoking, using drugs, or engaging in unsafe
sex as a sign of individual weakness.
Are such efforts illiberal or unacceptably paternalistic? Under
imaginable assumptions, they should not be so regarded. Choices
are a function of norms for which individual agents are not
responsible and which, on reflection, many or most agents may not
endorse. This is conspicuously so in the context of risk-taking
activity involving cigarettes, drugs, unsafe sex, and firearms. Much
discussion of whether law should respect "preferences" or "choices"
is confused by virtue of its silence on the matter of social norms.
49
People may follow such norms despite the fact that they deplore
them.
It is important in this regard that social norms are often a
function of existing information. If people believe that smoking is
dangerous to themselves and to others, it is more likely that social
norms will discourage smoking. Certainly there has been a dramatic
norm cascade in the last thirty years with respect to smoking, a
cascade fueled in large part by judgments about adverse health
effects. Shifts in norms governing behavior may well be produced
by new information about risk (although norms can shift in both
directions; sometimes a perception of dangerousness increases the
attractiveness of behavior). One can imagine similar information-
induced norm cascades with respect to diet, exercise, and unsafe sex.
In fact, people often try to bring norms into accord with existing
information. When there is conflict between the two, people may
experience dissonance." The result of the dissonance may
produce new norms or new understandings of existing informa-
tion.51
'8 See Lessig, supra note 3, at 1022 ("[E]ducation does, or can do, much more than
convey information.... [I]n some cases education can alter social meanings.").
" Lessig provides a good corrective. See id.
5o See ELLuCKSON, supra note 15, at 174-75.
5" It would be wrong, however, to suggest that norms are closely aligned with
existing information. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE
(1982) (arguing that human information processing is not wholly objective and that,
in many cases, people delegate decisionmaking processes to institutions).
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Because information is the least intrusive regulatory strategy, it
should be the preferred option. Whether more aggressive strategies
make sense depends on the details.
IV. NORMS INVOLVING THE USE OF MONEY
A complex network of social norms governs the acceptable uses
of money. This is so in two different respects. First, some social
norms impose sanctions on using money as a reason for action.
Here people are not supposed to engage in certain acts if their
reason for doing so is financial gain. Second, and even more
intriguing, some social norms make different kinds of money non-
fungible: there the prevailing norms require different kinds of
money to be used for different purposes.5 2 These sets of norms
raise many complexities. They are also entangled with the expres-
sive function of law. Finally, they suggest that it is sometimes
inappropriate to infer general valuations from particular choices,
because those choices are a function of norms that are limited to
the context in which they are made.
A. Norms Against the Use of Money
Let us begin with norms punishing the use of money as a reason
for action. A recent essay by Joel Waldfogel, The Deadweight Loss of
Christmas,5" will help to introduce the point. The essay finds no
less than four million dollars in annual deadweight losses from the
fact that people give in-kind presents rather than mere cash on
Christmas Day. Waldfogel's analysis is simple. For those who give
presents, the cost of Christmas is higher than it would be if they
gave cash instead. The cost of gift-giving includes not just the
expenditure of money, but also the resources expended on gift-
selection. And for those who receive presents, the benefit is
typically lower than it would be if they received cash. The recip-
ient would be better off if he received cash, which he could use
as he wished-just as food stamps are worth less than their dollar
value because, unlike cash, they can only be spent on food. The
52 See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 96 (1994) (discussing
the ways in which tipping creates "distance and inequality between donor and
recipient").
'Joel Waldfogel, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1328
(1993).
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four million dollar "waste" is a result of these sorts of consider-
ations.
What does Waldfogel neglect? The answer has a great deal to
do with prevailing social norms.' In many contexts, social norms
severely discourage the giving of cash rather than, say, a tie, a book,
or a sweater. Under existing norms, a cash present-from a husband
to a wife, for example-may reflect contempt or indifference. This
is precisely because cash is fungible. A tie or a book-whether or
not it is a wonderful tie or a wonderful book-fits well with norms
that call for a degree of individualized attention on the part of the
donor. Part of what Waldfogel neglects is the cluster of Christmas-
related norms and the social meaning of diverse forms of gift-
giving.
55
What can be said for Christmas can be said for many areas of
social life where money is deemed an inappropriate basis for action.
For example, if someone asks an adult neighbor to shovel his walk
or to mow his lawn in return for money, the request will often be
regarded as an insult, because it is based on an inappropriate
valuation of the neighbor. The request embodies a conception of
neighborliness that is, under existing norms,judged improper. This
is so even if the offeree might clearly prefer to receive, say, twenty-
five dollars over not mowing a lawn for, say, an hour. Quite
generally it is inappropriate to offer money to one's friends in
return for hurt feelings, disappointments, tasks, or favors. In fact,
the universe of cases in which norms disallow monetary exchange
is very large, and unremarked upon only because it is so taken for
granted. It would be quite strange to give an adult a certain sum of
money after hearing that his parent had died, or to ask a colleague
to clean up your office for, say, two hundred and fifty dollars. This
is so even though favors are of course common, and even though
there can be "in kind" implicit transactions between friends,
neighbors, and even spouses.
There is often a connection between norms that block exchanges
and ideas about equal citizenship. The exchange can be barred by
5' A separate issue has to do with cash management as a strategy of self-control.
Someone might prefer a tie to its cash equivalent because the cash would end up in
the bank, given the agent's self-control strategies. See Richard Thaler, Mental
Accounting Matters (1995) (manuscript at 1-6) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the University of Chicago Business School).
"There is a background issue about why we have some norms and not others.
I do not have an answer to this question. Some norms may, however, be helpful
strategies of self-control. See id.
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social norms because of a perception that, while there may be
disparities in social wealth, the spheres in which people are very
unequal ought not to invade realms of social life in which equality
is a social norm or goal.5  The prohibition on vote-trading is one
example. So too with certain complex social bans on the use of
wealth to buy services or goods from other people.5" Some part of
the intricate web of norms covering the exchange of money among
both friends and strangers is connected with the principle of civic
equality. Monetary exchange would reflect forms of inequality that
are not legitimate in certain spheres.
Familiar objections to "commodification" 8 are part and parcel
of social norms banning the use of money. The claim is that people
ought not to trade sexuality or reproductive capacities on markets
because market exchange of these "things" is inconsistent with
social norms identifying their appropriate valuation.59 The claim
is not that markets value sexuality "too much" or "too little;" rather,
it is that markets value these activities in the wrong way. Judge
Posner's well-known writings on the "baby market" do not quite
address this particular objection.60 Under existing practice, social
norms of course affect the adoption of children and impose severe
sanctions on any effort (literally) to sell children even to willing and
loving parents. The fact that the adoption market is accompanied
by safeguards making any "sale" at most implicit is an important way
of reaffirming existing norms.
' For a discussion of this idea see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALrrY (1983).
-7 I do not mean to approve of the ban on these exchanges, a matter that turns,
as I discuss below, on a complex range of considerations.
" See Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1871
(1987).
" We should be wary, however, of a rapid movement away from judgments
about appropriate modes of valuation to a particular position about law. See infra
notes 65-66 (discussing the relationship between tort law and the reluctance of
individuals to insure against physical and emotional losses). This is a basis, I think,
for questioning some of the applications of the general claims in ANDERSON, supra
note 14.
' See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 409-17 (1992); Richard A.
Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987)
(describing how a free market in babies would operate and explaining why the market
should be allowed to function in this area); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978) (proposing a practical
method for creating a market for adoption).
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B. Law and Money
The point very much bears on law. In many ways, law tries to
fortify norms regulating the use of money and to prevent new social
practices from eroding those norms. This is an important domain
for the expressive use of law. It is connected with the effort to
create separate social spheres-some in which money is appropri-
ately a basis for action, some in which money cannot be used.
The law bans a wide range of uses of money. Votes cannot be
traded for cash; the same is true of body parts. Prostitution is
illegal. There is of course a sharp social debate about surrogate
motherhood, and those who seek legal proscriptions are thinking in
expressive terms.6 One of their goals may be to fortify existing
social norms that insulate reproduction from the sphere of
exchange.62  Or their argument may be less instrumental: They
may seek to make a "statement" about reproduction without also
seeking to affect social norms.
C. Positive and Normative Statements: Hazardous General
Inferences from Particular Norm-Dependent Choices
The existence of norms involving cash exchange bear on the
possibility of inferring global judgments from particular consump-
tion choices that are dependent on context-specific norms. Here I
am concerned not with norms banning the use of dollars as a reason
for action, but instead with norms that subsidize or tax certain
consumption decisions. The point is important because economists
often explore particular choices as a means of understanding
general valuations.' But often this is a mistake, because particular
choices are a function of social norms that are limited to the
particular context. In a different context, the governing norms may
be quite different.
Suppose, for example, that someone buys Volvos or some safety
device for her home. Can we infer from such purchases something
about that person's valuation of life and health? If the particular
61 See ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 168-86.
62 See e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988); Doe v. Kelly, 307 N.W.2d 438
(Mich. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). I do not mean to endorse legal
prohibitions of this sort. See infra part VI.A.
63See, e.g., W. KIP Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBUC AND PRIVATE RESPONSI-
BILrTIES FOR RISK 17 (1992) ("Addressing value-of-life issues by focusing on our
attitudes toward lotteries involving small risks of death provides a methodology for
formulating these issues in a sound economic manner.").
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purchase is dependent on context-specific norms, the answer is
probably no. Social norms in a relevant community may "subsidize"
the purchase of Volvos or of a certain safety device. The decision
to purchase may stem from reputational effects or from the effects
of the purchase on the agent's self-conception. In another context,
with different norms, reputational effects may be quite different
and, hence, choices will be different as well. Perhaps norms
subsidize the purchase of Volvos but also subsidize a willingness to
travel to especially dangerous areas. Because social norms affect
choice and diverge according to context, the value a person places
on his safety cannot be described in the abstract.6 Risk-reducing
choices have a great deal to do with norms connected to the setting
in which choices are made.
Some analysts suggest that people's decisions not to insure
certain goods-freedom from pain and suffering, the well-being
of one's children-have important implications for tort law.65
Perhaps the absence of insurance suggests a judgment that injuries
of that kind do not deserve compensation (by people's own lights).
But if the refusal to insure such goods is a product of social
norms that are limited to the context of insurance, it may be wrong
to draw a general conclusion about the appropriate domain of tort
law.66
We may conclude with the suggestion that an important feature
of social norms is their enormous dependence on context. A
complex network of norms govern the purchase of insurance; these
norms make it difficult to infer, from failures of purchase, global
judgments about valuation. The point makes it hazardous to draw
general inferences from particular choices.
6 7
64 Cf. G. TOLLEY ET AL., VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY (1994) (finding large
disparities in people's willingness to pay to reduce different risks).
6See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1546 (1987) ("Individuals... do not voluntarily insure for non-pecuniary
losses"); Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALE L.J. 353, 367 (1988) ("[G]iven current evidence, the aspect of strict liability
that prohibits firms from shifting the risk of incurring nonpecuniary harm to
consumers cannot be justified by reference to the goal of compensating consumers
for harm.").
" See Stephen P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniaty Costs of Acddents:
Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1787, 1914 (1995)
(challenging the view that tort law is in need of fundamental reform because it
mandates a type of insurance that the sovereign consumer does not demand).67 See Sunstein, supra note 16 (manuscript pt. III.A) (discussing some difficulties
with the term "preferences" in light of the role of social norms).
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D. Non-fungible Money and Social Norms
Money is generally treated as the paradigm of a fungible good;
one dollar is as good as any other dollar, and no different from it.
But social norms mean that money itself may not be fungible.6 The
uses of money and the place of different "kinds" of money are
pervasively affected by social norms. People put money in differ-
ent mental compartments and act accordingly. Some money is
specially reserved for the support of children. Some money is for
gifts. Some is for one's own special fun. Some money is to be
given to charities. Some money is for summer vacation. Some
money is for a rainy day. Some money is for celebrations. If you
receive a fee for a lecture, or a small amount from the lottery, you
may use it for a special, outlandishly expensive dinner, whereas
"other" money could not in good conscience be used for that
purpose.
Social norms create qualitative differences among human
goods, 69 and these qualitative differences are matched by ingeni-
ous mental operations involving qualitative differences among
different "kinds" of money. Thus a study of practices in Orange
County, California reports that residents keep "a variety of
domestic 'cash stashes'--generally one in the billfold of each
adult, children's allowances and piggy banks, a petty cash fund in
a teapot-equivalent, a dish of change for parking meters or
laundry--or 'banked stashes of money,' including Christmas club
savings and accounts designated for special expenditures like
property or other taxes, vacations, or home and car insurance
payments."
7 1
In short, there are complex procedures of "mental accounting,"
in which money that falls in certain compartments is assessed
only in terms of its particular intended uses, and not compared
with money that has been placed in different mental compart-
ments.71 We cannot understand the uses of money itself without
understanding the role of social norms. Social theorists have
often feared that the use of money would "flatten" social life,
above all by erasing qualitative distinctions. But it would be more
accurate to report that social life, pervaded as it is by social
68 See ZELJZER, supra note 52, at 18 ("Despite its transferability, people make every
effort to embed money in particular times, places, and social relations.").69 See ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 3-8.
70 Id. at 5 (quotingJEAN LAVE, UNDERSTANDING PRACTICE 132-33 (1988)).
71 See Thaler, supra note 54 (manuscript at 1-10).
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norms, has "unflattened" money, by insisting on and enforcing
qualitative distinctions. 2 "There is no single, uniform, generalized
money, but multiple monies: people earmark different currencies
for many or perhaps all types of social interactions.... And people
will in fact respond with anger, shock, or ridicule to the 'misuse' of
monies for the wrong circumstances or social relations ... ."s
Thus laws barring the use of money in certain contexts are
complemented by norms barring the use of certain money, such as
retirement money, for certain purposes, such as gambling or
vacation.
E. Non-fungible Money and Law
Often decisions about money can be made through private
mechanisms that do not require special legal help. These mecha-
nisms may be as simple as a mental notation. They may be more
complex, taking the form of different bank accounts understood
to be used for different purposes. Social norms in families
and small communities often fortify these efforts,74 with certain
forms of money being seen as "for a rainy day" or as basically
untouchable.
Law can also play a role. Some measures that might be seen as
puzzling, or as objectionably paternalistic, make more sense if they
are understood as precommitment strategies reflecting diverse
"kinds" of money or as efforts to facilitate people's efforts to place
their money in different categories. As a facilitative strategy,
consider the Individual Retirement Account (IRA). IRAs are
created by a complex set of legal provisions. One of their virtues is
that they allow people more easily to separate their money into
different "kinds." The social security system is mandatory, not
optional, but it becomes more intelligible if we understand that
people often like to have help in putting their money into different
accounts with different uses. This is hardly a full defense of the
social security system in its current form, but it might help in
understanding any legal effort to allow or require money to be
separated into different compartments.
72 See id.
73 ZELIZER, supra note 52, at 18-19.
4 See generally Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996).
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V. EQUALnTy, SOCIAL NoRMS, AND S6cuAL CHANGE
Norms of partiality 5 are an important part of social inequality.
Social norms may require women to perform the most domestic
labor; in many places, women who refuse to do so incur social
sanctions and may even feel ashamed. The social meaning of a
woman's refusal may be a refusal to engage in her appropriate
gender role."6 Hence it may signal a range of undesirable traits.
In the areas of both race and gender, prevailing norms help
constitute inequality. And here, as elsewhere, collective action is
necessary to reconstitute existing norms.
Of course private norm entrepreneurs may be able to accom-
plish a great deal. With respect to the division of domestic
labor between men and women, private efforts at norm man-
agement have played an important role. Individual acts that
are expressive in character-a refusal to make dinner, for example-
are an important part of modern feminism. But the expressive
function of law is often especially important here, and it can
move to the fore in public debates. If a discriminatory act is
consistent with prevailing norms, there will be more in the way
of discriminatory behavior. If discriminators are ashamed of
themselves, there is likely to be less discrimination. The social
meaning of an act of sexual harassment will have a great deal to
do with the amount of sexual harassment in that particular
environment. A large point of law may be to shift social norms
and social meaning. Consider in this connection the fact that
many restaurant owners and inn-keepers actually supported the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which would have prevented them from
discriminating." Why would people want the state to act against
them? The answer lies in the fact that the law helped shift social
norms and the social meaning of nondiscrimination. Whereas non-
discrimination would formerly signal a willingness to act on a race-
neutral basis-and hence would trigger social norms that call for
discrimination against blacks-it would henceforth signal a willing-
75 See ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 30, at 134-97 (discussing norms involving
partiality and inequality).76 See generally SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989)
(discussing the importance of equitably distributing labor within the family and
rejecting arguments that the gender-structured family is directed by nature or that its
noble virtues preclude equitable redistribution of labor).
" See Lessig, supra note 3, at 965-67.
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ness to obey the law, and hence fail to trigger adverse social
norms.
78
In Part IV, I dealt with cases in which social norms discourage
cash payments in interpersonal relationships. But social norms
help constitute a wide range of qualitatively different kinds of
valuation, 79 and these diverse valuations much affect behavior
and the social meaning of behavior. These norms are omnipresent
and are usually taken for granted. Imagine, for example, that
John treats a beautiful diamond in the same way that most people
treat friends, or that Jane values a plant in the same way that most
people value their children, or that Sandy values her car like most
people value art or literature. Antidiscrimination law is often
designed to change norms so as to ensure that people are treated
with a kind of dignity and respect that discriminatory behavior
seems to deny.
The point is not limited to race and sex equality. Consider, as
an especially interesting example, the movement for animal rights.
Some people think that animals should be treated with dignity and
respect, and not as if they existed solely for human consumption
and use." This view is very much about social norms; it need not
entail the further claim that animal life is infinitely valuable. It is
best taken as a recommendation for a shift in norms governing the
treatment of animals, accompanied by a judgment that the new
norms will have consequences for what human beings do. The
recommendation may be based on the view that, if we see animals
(and nature in general) in this way, we will solve collective action
problems faced by human beings in preserving animal life important
for human lives; it may be based on a noninstrumental effort to
extend ideals of basic dignity to all living things. Of course
judgments of this kind must be defended.
VI. QUALIFICATIONS
The discussion thus far has certainly not been exhaustive. There
are many areas in which law is used in an expressive way, largely in
order to manage social norms. The criminal law is a prime arena
for the expressive function of law; and as we have seen, the debate
718 See id.
" See ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 5-20.
80 See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHIcS FOR OUR TREATMENT
OF ANIMALS 1-26 (1976).
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over flag burning has everything to do with the statement that law
makes. I hope I have said enough thus far to show the wide range
of possible "expressions" via law and to see how the law might
plausibly be used to manage social norms.
In this Section I qualify the basic argument. The first set of
qualifications stems from a hard question: How might participants
in law compare the statement made by law with the (direct)
consequences produced by law? What if the statement seems right
but the consequences are unfortunate? The second set of qualifica-
tions emerges from the need to impose constraints on the expres-
sive function of law. Both of these issues are extremely large and
complex. I restrict myself to a few brief observations.
A. Consequences
I have suggested that some expressivists are concerned with
norm management, whereas others are concerned with the
"statement" law makes entirely apart from its consequences. As the
epigraph from Herbert Simon suggests, expressivists can seem both
fanatical and ineffectual-a most unfortunate combination. For
those who endorse the expressive function of law, the most
important testing cases arise when (a) people support laws because
of the statement made by such laws but (b) the effects of such laws
seem bad or ambiguous, even by reference to the values held by
their supporters. How should such cases be understood? My basic
proposition is that, at least for purposes of law, any support for
"statements" should be rooted not simply in the intrinsic value of
the statement, but also in plausible judgments about its effect on
social norms and hence in "on balance" judgments about its
consequences.81 Here we can bridge the gap between con-
sequentialists and expressivists by showing that good expressivists
are consequentialists too.
Consider, for example, the debate over emissions trading in
environmental law. Some of the most pervasive objections to
emissions trading are expressive in nature.82 Critics claim that
81 This is a difference between law and the case of the individual agent, where
Williams's view seems more convincing. See Williams, supra note 21, at 85-88
(explaining that the relation of an individual agent's action to the good state of affairs
that accompanies the action "may not be that of cause to effect-the good state of
affairs may be constituted, or partly constituted, by the agent's doing that act").
I See KELMAN, supra note 11, at 27-28 (arguing that a society "fails to make a
statement stigmatizing polluting behavior" when it relies upon economic incentives
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emissions trading has damaging effects on social norms by making
environmental amenities seem like any other commodity: a good
that has its price, to be set through market mechanisms. Thus they
suggest that emissions trading systems may have damaging effects
on social norms by making people see the environment as some-
thing without special claims to public protection. To some extent
the suggestion might be taken as an empirical prediction and
evaluated as such. Will emissions trading systems have substantial
effects on social norms associated with the environment?
On that issue, we may be able to make some progress. We have
an empirical question subject, in principle, to empirical resolution.
If emissions trading programs could be shown to have bad effects
on social norms, they might be rejected notwithstanding their other
virtues; perhaps the overall effects on such programs would be bad.
(Compare this to the question whether to require recycling;
mandatory recycling might well have better effects on norms than
curbside charges.) But in the area of emissions trading programs,
a high degree of skepticism is appropriate with respect to the
expressivist's concern. Public attitudes toward the environment do
not depend much on whether government has a command-and-
control system or instead relies on economic incentives.
Of course, some people appear to think that consequences are
barely relevant, and that it is intrinsically problematic to "say,"
through law, that environmental amenities are ordinary goods with
appropriate prices. Is this a good objection to emissions trading
programs if (as we might suppose) such programs can save billions
of dollars in return for the same degree of environmental protec-
tion?"3 I do not believe that the objection has much force if, in
fact, costs are lower, jobs are saved, the air is cleaner, norms are
held constant, and fewer people are poor. On what basis should the
"statement" made by law be taken to be cause for concern?
Or take the issue of minimum wage legislation. A possible
justification for such legislation is expressive in nature. Some
people might think that government ought to make a statement to
the effect that human labor is worth, at a minimum, $X per hour;
perhaps any amount less than $X seems like an assault on human
to carry out environmental policies).
" See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, ReformingEnvironmental Law: The
Democratic Case forMarket Incentives, 13 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) (arguing that
the environmental regulation debate is flawed because it fails to focus on the
comparative consequences of alternate solutions).
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dignity. But suppose too that the consequence of the minimum
wage is to increase unemployment among the most vulnerable
members of society." It is not easy to know how to weigh the
"statement" against the bad consequences. Part of the attraction of
the expressive view is that inquiries into consequences often seem
difficult and complex, and perhaps not subject to resolution at all.
But if an increase in the minimum wage would really drive vulnera-
ble people out of the workplace in significant numbers, it is hard to
see why people should support it. We can thus see that expressive
approaches to law verge on fanaticism where effects on norms are
unlikely and where the consequences of the "statement" are bad.
In this sense, there is ample reason to endorse Herbert Simon's
remarks at the beginning of this Article.
The debate over flag burning is an especially revealing case in
point. It seems reasonable to suppose that the principal effect of a
constitutional amendment allowing flag burning to be criminalized
would be to increase the number of acts of flag burning. Even if
this is so, many people would support the amendment because of
its expressive value. Perhaps their view makes sense if the amend-
ment would have significant effects on social norms and if those
effects would be good. But if these are not simultaneously likely-
and they do not seem to be-it is far from clear that it makes sense
to devote a substantial amount of public and private resources to
promoting an amendment dealing with flag burning.
Thus far, I have tried to resolve a possible debate between
expressivists and consequentialists by suggesting that, without
desirable effects on social norms, there is not much point in
endorsing expressively motivated law. At most, we might say that
good statements are worth supporting when judgments about
consequences are unclear. But we may be able to make more
progress by rethinking the relationship between expressivists and
consequentialists. I have suggested that good expressivists are also
consequentialists, but we may speculate too that all good consequen-
tialists are ultimately expressivists, at least in the general sense that
an expressive theory of some sort helps people to identify conse-
quences as such. This will not entirely bridge what I have been
' This is of course a disputed question. Compare DAVID CARD & ALAN B.
KRUEGER, MYrH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
(1995) (analyzing studies showing that minimum wage increases have no effect on
employment) with FINIS WELCH, MINIMUM WAGES: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE (1978)
(claiming that minimum wage increases produce greater unemployment).
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treating as a gap between the two camps; but it may make it
necessary to recharacterize the opposition.
We might be tempted to suppose that people can avoid
expressive concerns entirely and that it is possible to assess law
solely on the basis of consequences-that an open-ended, "all things
considered" inquiry into consequences is a feasible way of evaluat-
ing legal rules. s5 But this is not actually possible. The effects of
any legal rule can be described in an infinite number of ways. Any
particular characterization or accounting of consequences will rest
not on some depiction of the brute facts; instead it will be mediated
by a set of (often tacit) norms determining how to describe or
conceive of consequences. It is possible to see a large part of the
expressive function of law in the identification of what consequenc-
es count and how they should be described. Something of this sort
is inevitable. Because any conception of consequences is interpre-
tive and thus evaluative in character, simple or unmediated conse-
quentialism is not a feasible project for law (or for anything else).
More precisely, any description of the effects of some legal rule
is a product of expressive norms that give consequences identifiable
social meanings-including norms that deny legal significance to
certain consequences. When it seems as if we can talk about
consequences alone, it is only because the mediating expressive
norms are so widely shared that they present no controversy.
To say this does not make expressive approaches to law less than
distinctive. Many people focus on the "statement" made by law, and
vote accordingly, without inquiring into the (expressively mediated)
consequences of the law. We have seen that this is true of capital
punishment, flag burning, and more. Many people are especially
interested in the effects of law on social norms. Probably the best
conception of expressivism, for law, is very much focused on conse-
quences-not simply consequences for norms-and self-conscious
about the expressive norms that make consequences count, and
make different consequences count in different ways.
B. Constraints, Liberal and Otherwise
What barriers should there be to governmental efforts at
managing social norms? The simplest answer is that the same
barriers as there are to any other kind of governmental action
"This is an aspiration of cost-benefit analysis.
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should apply. There is nothing distinctive about norm management
that requires a special set of constraints.
86
Thus, for example, government should not be permitted to
invade rights, whatever our understanding of rights may be. The
rights constraints that apply to government action generally are
applicable here as well. If government tried to change social norms
so as to ensure that everyone is a Christian, it would violate the
right to religious liberty; if government tried to change social norms
so as to ensure that women occupy domestic roles, and men do not,
it would violate the Equal Protection Clause. At least these
conclusions make sense if government action is coercive.
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Quite apart from the question of rights, there is always a risk
that efforts at norm management will be futile or counterproduc-
tive. We can imagine, for example, that when government attempts
to move social norms in a particular direction, it may fail miserably.
Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" policy with respect to drugs may well
be an example. It is necessary to ensure that those who engage in
norm management are trusted by the people whose norms are at
issue. For this reason it may be best for government to attempt to
enlist intermediate organizations, so as to ensure that people with
authority in relevant communities are participating in the process.
Some people would go further than this. On one view, any
effort at norm management is illegitimate; this is a project that is
off limits to government. But it is hard to see how this argument
might be made persuasive. Effects on social norms are not easily
avoided; any system of government is likely to affect norms,
including creation of the basic systems of contract, tort, and
property. Moreover, intentional norm management is a conven-
tional and time-honored part of government. Of course we could
imagine abuses, even unspeakable ones. But the proper response
is to insist on a wide range of rights-based constraints on the
management of social norms through law.88
' Indeed government engages in norm management on a regular basis, whether
or not it does so intentionally. See Lessig, supra note 3, at 945-46.
11 At present there appear to be few constitutional constraints on propaganda
campaigns. See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLrTICS, LAW AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 52-55 (1978).
" Relevant here is the suggestion that government may not attempt to vindicate
'external preferences," that is, preferences about what other people should prefer.
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234-38 (1977). I believe that the
supposed prohibition is rooted in confusions; it does not sort out the idea of
"preference," and it obtains its force from hypothetical cases involving rights
violations having nothing to do with external preferences. See.JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS
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There is a final point. The social meaning of law will constrain
the legitimate or permissible content of law. The meaning, set as
it is by social norms, may make government efforts unsuccessful. As
Daniel Kahan has shown, for example, debates over criminal
sanctions are strongly affected by this problem.89  So-called
intermediate sanctions for criminal violations are often unpopular
because they are taken to "mean" something other than public
opprobrium. When a violator is told to engage in community
service, he appears to have "gotten off," even if the service is, to
him, worse than a short period injail. Hence the social meaning of
the law makes the law unacceptable to the community at large. If
intermediate sanctions are to be feasible, the norms that accompany
them must shift as well.
The point is a general one. The meaning of legal statements is
a function of social norms, not of the speaker's intentions. The
government may take a range of steps to discourage teenagers from
smoking; but if those steps make smoking seem like a delicious
forbidden fruit, they may be counterproductive. Measures designed
to discourage unwed parenthood may actually encourage unwed
parenthood. This is simply a special case of the general phenome-
non of unintended consequences. 90 Of course unintended effects,
either realized because of existing norms or in the form of unantici-
pated changes in existing norms, may be good as well as bad.
C. Norm Management and Communication
For law to perform its expressive function well, it is important
that law communicate well.9" Unfortunately, "law" is not an agent
and it cannot speak. Statute books are rarely read and are barely
intelligible when they are read. The same is even more emphatically
true for the Federal Register. Supreme Court decisions are at best
filtered through newspapers and magazines. Thus, the use of law
for norm management receives articulation through the anticipation
IN THE PUBLIc DOMAIN 94-98 (1994); Sunstein, supra note 16 (manuscript pt. IV.A.4).
9 See Kahan, supra note 14 (manuscript at 17) ("[T]he failure of alternative
sanctions to displace imprisonment stems from their social meaning.").
o For a discussion of the unintended cultural consequences of legal rules, see
Pildes, supra note 13, at 937 (discussing the need to influence specific public
programs by "attend[ing] to profound disaffections with the modern regulatory state"
and by recognizing that "public values are constituted not only at the grandest levels
of policy formation, but also in the myriad microscopic day-to-day experiences of
policy").
" I am grateful to Robert Ellickson for raising this point.
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and enforcement of sanctions and through clarifying and supporting
statements by politicians.
This fact can create a range of problems for effective law
enforcement. The statement made by law may be different from the
statement heard by the audience, because the sanctions are inade-
quately understood and because the supporting statements can be
unintelligible or misleading. If the law's expressive function is to be
performed well, it is important to develop ways to reduce these
problems. A good beginning would be the wealth of work about
effective and ineffective risk communication.
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CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that law, like action in general, has an
expressive function. Some people do what they do mostly because
of the statement the act makes; the same is true for those who seek
changes in law. Many debates over the appropriate content of law
are really debates over the statement that law makes, independent
of its (direct) consequences. I have suggested that the expressive
function of law has a great deal to do with the effects of law on
prevailing social norms. Often law's "statement" is designed to
move norms in fresh directions.
Least controversially, law may attempt to generate norms that
will solve collective action problems. The central point here is that
from the standpoint of individual agents, norms are given rather
than chosen, and agents would sometimes like norms to be other
than what they are. Often shifts in norms are a low-cost method of
achieving widely or universally held social goals-as the intrinsic
utility of choice stays constant while the reputational consequences
of choice begin to shift. Far more controversial is the use of law to
fortify social norms involving the permissible use of money. A
liberal society ensures a measure of sphere differentiation, in which
the realm of markets and market thinking is not coextensive with
the realms of politics and family life. Hence social norms regulating
the use of money are an important part of a well-functioning liberal
society. Sometimes law is used to fortify those norms or to prevent
them from becoming atrophied. Bans on the sale of sexual and
reproductive capacities are an important illustration.
'2 See, e.g., Morgan et al., Communicating Risks to the Public, 26 ENVTL. Sci. TECH.
2048 (1992).
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For purposes of legal policy, some of the most interesting cases
of norm management through law involve the control of risky
behavior and the promotion of social equality. Risky behavior is
often a product of social norms that people would very much like,
on reflection, to change. And with respect to risk, American society
has witnessed dramatic changes in prevailing norms in the last
decades. Cigarette smoking is the most striking example, but
similar shifts can be seen in the areas of alcohol use, drug use,
seatbelt use, carrying guns, and diet and exercise. If government
sees prevailing norms as a tax on or a subsidy to choice, it might
seek to change norms as a way of changing choices. Certainly the
point helps account for antidiscimination poicy, where a goal is to
alter norms associated with both taste-based discrimination and
rational stereotyping.
Are efforts at norm management unacceptably paternalistic or
illiberal? In many cases they are not. As I have emphasized, norms
are generally given rather than chosen. Sometimes people would
like norms to be changed; often they do not have a considered view
about which norms are best, but, if they reflected a bit, they would
wish norms to be something other than what they are. When this
is so, it is entirely legitimate to use law to alter norms that encour-
age people to shorten their own lives, at least when they do so in
order to avoid reputational cost and without much in the way of
increased intrinsic utility. Certainly efforts at norm management
are more legitimate if they have a democratic pedigree. More
generally, attention to the effects of social norms helps show that
"choices" should not be taken as sacrosanct. 93
All this leaves open a number of questions. Among the most
pressing are empirical ones. Why do norm cascades occur? To
what extent have shifts in norms been a function of law? How can
law be made effective in shifting norms? What variables account for
effective norm-change? There are also important theoretical issues
about constraints on norm management. It is particularly important
to decide how to handle situations in which laws motivated by
expressive goals have mixed or bad consequences. I have argued
that legal "statements" producing bad consequences should not be
endorsed. But my simplest suggestion here is that we begin to make
93 See Lessig, supra note 3, at 951 (arguing that "social meanings exist" and that
"their force in part hangs upon their restingupon a certain uncontested, or taken-for-
granted, background of thought or expectation"); Sunstein, supra note 16 (manuscript
pt. llI.A) (discussing relationships between choices and norms).
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sense of law's expressive function if we attend to the role of law in
the management of social norms. No system of law can entirely
avoid that role; even markets themselves-which are very much a
creation of law-are exercises in norm management. In these
circumstances it is best for government to proceed pragmatically
and contextually, seeing which norms are obstacles to well-being,
and using law when law is effective in providing correctives.

